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A compartmental epidemic model is proposed to predict the Covid-
19 virus spread. It considers: both detected and undetected infected
populations, medical quarantine and social sequestration, plus pos-
sible reinfection. The coefficients in the model are evaluated by fit-
ting to empirical data for six US states: California, Louisiana, New
Jersey, New York State, Texas, and Washington State. The evolution
of Covid-19 is fairly similar among the states: contact and detection
rates remain below 5%; however, variations are larger in death rate,
recovery rate, and stay-at-home effect. The results reveal that out-
breaks may have been well underway in several states before first de-
tected and that some western states might have seen more than one
influx of the pandemic. For the majority of states the model’s effec-
tive reproduction number is slightly above the critical value of one,
indicating that Covid-19 will become endemic, spreading for more
than two years. Should stay-at-home orders be revoked, most states
may experience oscillating yearly infections. Even if additional lock-
downs are applied in Texas, and then released according to White
House guidelines of 14 days of decreasing cases, a similar endemic
situation may occur. Additionally, if lockdowns had been instituted
one to three weeks sooner, the number of Covid-19 deaths in New
York could have been significantly reduced, but surprisingly not in
Texas.
Compartment model | Covid-19 |
A cluster of pneumonia cases resulting from an unknownpathogen was identified in December 2019 by Chinese
Health authorities in the city of Wuhan (Hubei), China (1).
The pathogen has been identified as a novel strain of coro-
navirus, SARS-CoV-2 (1), now named Covid-19 (2). The
exponential growth of the disease prompted Chinese author-
ities to introduce their strictest level of measures to contain
its outbreak, including Wuhan city lockdown, banning pub-
lic gatherings, suspending public transport, and prohibiting
travel between cities (3). Despite these measures, a global
pandemic ensued, with 3,855,809 total worldwide cases and
265,861 deaths as of May 9, 2020 as declared by the World
Health Organization (WHO) (4).
The first cases of community transmission in the United
States were reported in California, Oregon, Washington state
and New York state in late February, 2020 (5). A Santa Clara,
California death on Feb. 6 was deemed the country’s first
Covid-19 fatality after an autopsy was conducted in April
(5). A national emergency was declared by US President
Donald Trump on March 13, 2020, and testing several days
later revealed that Covid-19 had spread to all 50 states (5).
On March 20, New York City was declared the US outbreak
epicenter (5). A study, released on April 2020 as a preprint,
found via genetic analysis of Covid-19 cases in New York
City that the majority of the viruses originated in Europe –
revealing that transmissions had begun as early as January
from countries with no travel monitoring (6). As of May 9,
2020, the US had 1,245,874 confirmed Covid-19 cases, and
69,889 Covid-19 deaths (4).
Covid-19 challenges faced by the US include fair alloca-
tion of adequate medical resources (7), minimizing mortality,
avoiding overwhelming the health-care system, and keeping
the effects of lockdown and social distancing policies on the
economy within manageable levels (8). Epidemiological analy-
sis of the virus proliferation and spread is needed to assess the
impacts of mitigation strategies including social distancing,
sheltering-in-place (voluntary), and quarantines (enforced by
authorities) (8). We have developed a new compartmental
model, extending the well-established and celebrated SIR (Sus-
ceptible, Infected, Removed) model (9–11), to evaluate and
compare several states’ responses to Covid-19; with this model
we can make estimates, using curve fitting of reported empiri-
cal data, of the contact rate, the impact of contact-repression
measures, the basic reproduction number (R0), and the dates
for the peak numbers of detected and undetected cases. The
basic reproduction number of the majority of states examined
is found to be larger than the critical value of 1, leading to en-
demics. We simulated the effect of lifting stay-at-home orders
on the dates specified by most of the states examined, and find
that the number of infections increases by approximately an
order of magnitude, with a yearly oscillation in some states.
A new model
Our new SQUIDER model incorporates additional processes
into the classic SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) model:
i) making a distinction between known cases (which are pub-
licly reported) and asymptomatic or mild cases which are not
monitored or detected; ii) including the effects of responses,
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the compartments, with the rates of transition between the
compartments.
varying by region, to the pandemic, whether direct, through
quarantine or medical isolation of diagnosed cases, or less
direct such as social distancing efforts; and iii) possible loss of
immunity of recovered individuals, allowing some of them to
be reintroduced into the Susceptible population. The model
thus requires several new compartments, which we will denote
as U (Undetected infected), E (Excluded, meaning undetected
recovered and possible deaths), and Q (pseudo-Quarantine, a
bin to hold a segment of the susceptible and undetected in-
fected populations, that allows us to model lower contact rates
due to social distancing). Furthermore, for modeling/fitting
purposes we add a separate compartment D for known in-
fecteds who die; deaths from the virus is a statistic that is
generally available (12).
The rate equations are as follows:
dS
dt
= −βSUa − q(t)S + ρ(E +R) [1]
dU
dt
= βSUa − (q(t) + + δ)U [2]
dI
dt
= δU − (γ + α)I [3]
dR
dt
= αI − ρR [4]
dD
dt
= γI [5]
dQ
dt
= q(t)(U + S) [6]
dE
dt
= U − ρE [7]
Each compartment is normalized by the total population N
(includes deaths from Covid-19 but not births and deaths from
other causes - see below); hence
S +Q+ U + I +D + E +R = 1. [8]
Note that the rates α, β, δ, , γ, and ρ are constants (to be
evaluated from fits to data).
Before we go through the individual equations we should
discuss some of the recurring terms and factors. First, the
incidence rate βSUa, the average normalized new infections
in time, is nonlinear when a > 0. Here β is the contact rate,
which is the average number of contacts a person has per day,
multiplied by the probability of transmitting the disease when
contact between a susceptible and an Undetected infected
occurs. Detected Infecteds (I) are not involved since we as-
sume that, post-diagnosis, the I group are generally in medical
isolation or some other form of quarantine (13). If a = 1, this
term describes homogenous mixing of the Susceptible and Un-
detected infected populations (14), which may not be accurate
for states with isolated populations, low population densities,
or many densely populated areas. Power law incidence rates
(such as βSUa) have been shown to increase accuracy of SIR
models (15, 16).
Second, the factor q(t) models the effect of social distancing
and contact suppression regimes by sequestering a proportion
of the Susceptible and Undetetected infected populations at
a given time t∗. This does not imply that some large num-
ber of undiagnosed people are put into any actual physical
quarantine, only that the available compartment sub-groups
for infecting (U) and becoming infected (S) are reduced; al-
ternatively, this could be modeled by altering β or the power
law dependency a in a time-dependent way. Since the ODEs
work by transferring populations from one compartment to
another over time at different rates, the function q(t) is im-
plemented as a Gaussian pulse centered at a particular time
t∗, where t∗ is a fit parameter. The standard deviation and
height of the pulse are chosen so that a proportion of the
population (qmax = max(q(t))) is sequestered (this proportion
is another fit parameter). This Gaussian form was chosen, as
opposed to a constant value used by some authors (17–19),
as many states went into lockdown on a particular day with
many people self-isolating (20, 21). In particular, finding the
day t∗ where such a measure starts affecting the number of
cases is important, as it reflects the compliance of the state’s
population. This form for q(t) allows us to implement the
effect of full or partial relaxation of social distancing measures
(such as sheltering-at-home); the solver can be given negative
pulse strengths, with the sequestered population re-entered
into the susceptible population.
Equation 1 for the Susceptible population is reduced non-
linearly by new infections βSUa due to interactions, and ex-
plicitly reduced in a time dependent way by sequestration
q(t)S (not by any significant amount until we get close to the
activation time t∗), as well as increased again by re-entrance
at a rate ρ by members of the Excluded (E) and Recovered
(R) groups. This term was added due to the WHO revelation
that recovered Covid-19 patients may have little or waning
immunity after exposure (22).
Equation 2 for Undetected infecteds, includes the increase
due to contact with S members, and removal by various causes.
The rate  closely resembles the recovery rate in the basic SIR
model, which (since the model is static, implying that births
and deaths due to other causes are not considered) implicitly
includes deaths due to a potentially fatal disease. Note that,
at least in the early days of the pandemic, increased overall
deaths in comparison with the prior three years were not ex-
amined for signs that the virus was active among undiagnosed
populations (23). The detection rate δ specifies the proportion
of Undetected infected individuals who are diagnosed with
the virus (and are hence no longer undetected); it is added to
the I compartment. Finally, this population is also effectively
reduced due to social distancing q(t), e.g. residents of many
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states were encouraged to shelter at home and not seek test-
ing/diagnosis unless they became symptomatic, in order to
ease pressure on medical resources (24).
Equation 3 for the detected Infected population, describes
increases due to testing at rate δ and decreases due to death
with rate γ, and recovery with rate α. Since these individuals
are isolated in designated hospital wards or under quarantine
at home (13), hence unlikely to be a source of infection to the
community at large, we felt there was no need for sequestration
(i.e. q(t)) when social distancing went into effect. This is in
agreement with the WHO guidance on quarantines segregating
suspected exposed people (22).
Equation 4 describes the growth of detected Recovered, bal-
anced by outflux of the Recovered population into the suscep-
tible compartment at rate ρ due to little or waning immunity,
expected for human coronaviruses (25). Equation 5 describes
the increase in Deceased detected individuals. Equation 6
describes the increase in the pseudo-Quarantine compartment
due to official contact repression measures q(t), which as stated
above is only significant around the activation time t∗. Of
course, one expects that the coefficients for U and S could be
different, but are kept the same (q(t)) for simplicity, discussed
later. Equation 7 describes increases in the undetected recov-
ered population at rate , and decreases in this population due
to loss of immunity of E at rate ρ. Equation 8 is the trivial
statement that the sum of all of these compartments (S, Q,
U , I, D, E, R) add up to the total population N .
Assumptions
Several simplifying assumptions or idealizations have been
made. To begin with, in our model the detected Infecteds (I)
do not transmit the disease to the Susceptible (S) population.
It is generally the case that in all such disease outbreaks (e.g.
the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak), even when strict quarantine
measures are in place, medical service providers and other peo-
ple rendering direct aid to victims are themselves vulnerable
to infection; when the outbreak (in the non-healthcare worker
population) is contained they may even make up the substan-
tial proportion of cases (26). However, in the current situation
where the disease circulates through the general population,
and safety protocols (such as restricting visitation by friends
and relatives) are rigorously enforced by health providers, the
number of such cases is statistically negligible.
Other simplifying assumptions: as mentioned above, we
have opted to keep our contact rate β constant and instead vary
the S and U compartment population levels to mimic social
distancing effects (for example staying at home). In future
versions of our model we may incorporate time dependent
β or a in order to disentangle population wide transmission
suppression (e.g. face masks and other protective gear for
the public) from social contact suppression (cancellation of
concerts and other public gatherings), but for the sake of
simplicity in both coding and analysis we have opted for now
to use only one time dependent rate. In the same vein, the q(t)
function removes Susceptibles and Undetetected infecteds at
the same rate (we have no reason at this time to differentiate
the rates of change of these populations). Similarly, people
from the Excluded E and Recovered R compartments lose
immunity at the same rate ρ. Indeed, it is possible that people
who experienced milder forms of the disease (E) lose immunity
faster than those who experienced more severe symptoms
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Fig. 2. SQUIDER model fits. Fits of our compartment model to confirmed
cumulative case counts and deaths for (a) California (R2 = 0.9997), (b) Louisiana
(R2 = 0.9984), (c) New Jersey (R2 = 0.9994), (d) New York state (R2 = 0.9995),
(e) Texas (R2 = 0.9995), and (f) Washington state (R2 = 0.9994). Data was
obtained from The Johns Hopkins University (27).
and sought out treatment (R); however, we currently do not
have any information to justify different rates. Finally, we
do not consider the effects of births, vertical transmissions,
immigrants, emigrants, or deaths due to other diseases or
trauma. The inclusion of deaths due to diagnosed virus cases
makes the model not entirely static, but the disease’s total
deaths as a proportion of the total population is low enough
that births and other such aspects can be safely omitted.
Results. Figure 2 shows fits of the model to cumulative con-
firmed case counts and deaths due to Covid-19 for California,
Louisiana, New Jersey, New York State, Texas, and Wash-
ington State. The fits are all excellent – even for states that
have a decreasing trend in case counts. Fit parameters are
listed in Table 1. The parameters have similar values across
all of the states, where contact and detection rates vary by
less than 5%; however, death rate varies by 134%, recovery
rate by 82%, and stay-at-home effect by 39%. We compare
our fit parameters with the classical SIR model which, to
remind the reader, involves only Susceptible, Infected, and
Recovered compartments. The β and  parameters correspond
to the contact and recovery rates of the SIR model; the fit
values imply that for unconstrained epidemic situations (with
q(t) = δ = 0) the disease has a reproduction number R0 = β/
of around 5 and a duration of about a week, consistent with
prior investigations (19, 28).
It is surprising that the detection rate δ is so high (≈ 0.5);
however, a recent nationwide coronavirus antibody study by
the Spanish Health Ministry (29) suggests that the number
of unknown infected and unknown recovered in large and
heterogeneous jurisdictions, while significant, is not orders of
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parameter California Louisiana New Jersey New York Texas Washington
β 0.7482 0.7589 0.7614 0.7644 0.7485 0.7511
a 0.9943 0.9948 0.9966 0.9970 0.9943 0.9948
 0.1551 0.1441 0.1390 0.1361 0.1551 0.1545
δ 0.5035 0.5009 0.5073 0.5067 0.5036 0.5055
α 0.7324 0.7115 0.5104 0.4426 0.7404 0.8041
γ 0.0249 0.0213 0.0243 0.0339 0.0191 0.0145
ρ 0.0162 0.0750 0.0230 0.0084 0.0144 0.1181
qmax 0.1382 0.1728 0.1561 0.1894 0.1455 0.1365
t∗ 72.006 74.200 74.905 72.434 74.127 70.343
U(0)×N 0.0495 0.0265 0.2085 0.6786 0.0208 0.1443
Table 1. SQUIDER model fit parameters for several US states. t∗
values are days counting from January 22, 2020.
magnitude larger than the number of confirmed cases. This
goes against some prior speculation that the asymptomatic
and undiagnosed cases might be as much as 10 times the
official count (30), which would suggest a detection rate 5
times smaller than our δ.
Returning back to figure 2 and table 1, the death rate from
diagnosed cases γ falls between around 1 12% and 3
1
3%, which is
well within the quite wide range of case-fatality rates reported
for earlier phases of the pandemic (31). The recovery rate α
for diagnosed cases, seems somewhat high (in the 0.45 – 0.5
range for New York and New Jersey, and around 0.7 – 0.8
for the other states); this could reflect the fact that detection
of any disease would normally occur after that disease has
already partly run its course, but it should be kept in mind as
well that this compartment has a minimal effect on the size of
the fitted compartments I and D, so the fitting routine may
not be as constrained in selecting the α value as the other fit
parameters. The re-entry rate ρ is fairly low for most of the
states, which indicates that this is not a significant factor for
the development of the outbreak within the time period our
empirical data covers. Such low ρ values are not unreasonable
since loss of immunity to corona viruses can take months (25);
this is still an open issue for further study. As we see below,
this becomes important for longer-term predictions of our
model.
Our fitted peak sequestration values range over 0.13 - 0.19;
it should be kept in mind this is not the actual quarantining
of approximately 15% of the population, but rather the effect
of overall reduction in social contacts between susceptible and
infectious populations, which in the US was never pursued as
systematically or consistently as in some other jurisdictions.
The parameter t∗ enables prediction of what day self-isolation
policies started having significant effects on case counts. For
California this was April 2, Louisiana April 4, New Jersey
April 5, New York April 2, Texas April 4, and Washington
state March 31. To compare t∗ to states’ directives, stay-at-
home orders were issued in California on March 19, Louisiana
on March 23, New Jersey on March 21, New York on March 22,
suggested in Texas on April 2, and issued in Washington on
March 23 (32). The nearly week long time lag between state
action and its effect on most of the states should be expected
based on the infection lasting about a week as mentioned
above. It’s possible that Texas residents were following local
orders which prescribed sheltering in place sooner than the
state orders: Dallas had a state of emergency declared on
March 19, and Houston residents were urged to stay at home
on March 24 (33).
The initial values of the undetected infecteds U(0) are all
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Fig. 3. Computed results for the other compartments for differ-
ent states. Unknown infected (U), Excluded due to undetected recovery and
deaths (E), confirmed Infected (I), confirmed Recovered (R), and confirmed Deaths
(D).
less than one individual (some significantly), implying that
none of the states we look at had any actual cases on January
22 (the first day for which we have data). While the ODE
results can be scanned to find an estimate for the arrival of
the first case (or first two, or five cases) in a jurisdiction, some
caution should be exercised in applying this number, since
magnitudes at this point are still too small to make statistically
valid comparisons. Given that the model estimates there to
have been at least 10 cases in all the states studied by the 3rd
or 4th week of February (the 1st week of February for New
York) we think it is probable that Covid-19 was spreading
considerably sooner in New York, New Jersey, Texas, and
Louisiana than previously considered, implying that stronger
measures – such as travel bans, cluster identification, contact
tracing, and quarantine measures – were needed to fully contain
the outbreak (34, 35). California and Washington State had
reported cases already in late January, yet both the raw data
and our ODE model show the main outbreak occurred well
after New York or New Jersey. This is possible if the western
states were dealing successfully with cases coming directly
from Asia, but lost control of the outbreak when infected
individuals started arriving from the eastern US or possibly
Europe; possible differences between the Asian and European
strains is are not addressed here.
Figure 3 shows the behaviour of the U , E, and R compart-
ments, as well as I and D (fit populations) over the fit period
(January 22 to May 9, 2020). Note that the most striking
difference in the shapes of the curves among the states is that
between California and Louisiana – the other states lie on
the spectrum between them. It appears that sequestering S
and U populations had a much stronger effect in Louisiana
on Recovered and Excluded populations – with plateaus in
4 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Khan et al.
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state R0
California 1.0498
Louisiana 1.0192
New Jersey 1.0047
New York 0.9648
Texas 1.0439
Washington 1.0257
Table 2. Basic reproduction number R0 for the SQUIDER model for
several US states.
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Fig. 4. Model predictions. Total infected (U+I), detected Infected (I), and
confirmed daily deaths (D) for two years beyond the first day of recorded infections
for: (a) California, (b) Louisiana, (c) New Jersey, (d) New York, (e) Texas, and (f)
Washington state. (g) Cumulative death counts for each state.
these populations becoming apparent in April 2020. Similarly,
the Unknown infected and confirmed Infected cases rise much
less quickly in and beyond April, while the confirmed Deaths
continue to rise due to active infections. In contrast, in Califor-
nia, the values for all of the compartments are approximately
an order of magnitude smaller, though all of them increase
with a steady apparent slope through April and May, suggest-
ing that the outbreak is at an earlier stage. Note that this
is possible if California had to deal with a new outbreak of
cases as hypothesized above. The effect of applying contact
suppression measures (pseudo-quarantine) becomes apparent
on day t∗ in U curves in all of the states as it forms a small
hump in the curves (see figure 3). Notably, the states whose
undetected infected population U decreases after quarantine
are New Jersey and New York – these states put in strict
shelter at home measures (36), whereas, as an example, the
Texas governor did not make staying at home mandatory (37)
and permitted its residents to attend in-person church services
(38).
Table 2 shows the basic reproduction number R0 values
we have computed for our model among the states selected,
using the parameters listed in Table 1 obtained by fitting
the model to data and R0 =
βaS0U
a−1
0
δ++q(t) , as defined in the
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Fig. 5. Predictions for removal of quarantine. Total infected (U+I),
detected Infected (I), and confirmed daily deaths (D) for two years, with the quarantined
(Q) compartment reintroduced into the susceptible (S) compartment on the indicated
day set by state policy (except California) for: (a) California, (b) Louisiana, (c) New
Jersey, (d) New York, (e) Texas, and (f) Washington state.
Supporting Information, equation 11. Note that the epidemic
is expected to persist indefinitely if R0 > 1, as is predicted for
all states considered except New York. New York’s value is
approximately 0.96, likely due to stricter quarantine adherence
reflected in the highest qmax value – see Table 1. The other
states are predicted to have R0 close to, but larger than, unity,
suggesting that Covid-19 will not be eradicated unless stricter
measures are taken such as increased social distancing and
higher quarantine rates. That both extended simulations for
dates beyond those for which we have data (shown in figure
4) and R0 values predict that New York does not develop an
endemic infection gives us some confidence in this prediction.
Figure 4 shows that for the majority of the states examined
here, if contact suppression is maintained infections will peak
and fall at least over the next two years, in the absence of
factors such as inter-state migration and vaccination. The
peaks for Texas and Washington occur in fall/winter seasons,
whereas in California, Louisiana, and New Jersey the peaks
occur in the spring/summer seasons. As predicted by the
effective reproduction number R0, only New York appears to
eradicate the virus by Jan. 2021. The cause of the sharp rise
in deaths in New York state in figure 4g is not clear to us;
perhaps it is due to early saturation of the health care system
(39).
We can generate additional predictions for the effect of
lifting shelter-in-place and other social distancing measures, as
most of the selected states’ governors have declared re-opening
dates – Louisiana on May 15, New Jersey on June 5, New
York state on May 15, Texas on April 30, and Washington
state on July 12 (32). Figure 5 shows that the number of
infections, both total and detected, increases substantially over
the prediction in figure 4, and eventually decay for Louisiana
and Washington. Should New York and Texas not implement
additional measures beyond their re-opening dates – such as
contact tracing – a greatly increased peak number of infections,
as well as additional smaller peaks (say, due to a secondary
wave) may be anticipated. In the absence of any official
announcement on the subject by the State of California we
test the effect of hypothetical reopening at an arbitrary future
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Fig. 6. Predictions for removal of quarantine and its re-
application after 14 consecutive days of declining detected
cases for Texas. (a) The predicted number of cases following release of lockdown
suggestion following White House policy. Lockdown was applied April 4 and released
May 01, 2020. Predicted cases after: (b) a second lockdown applied May 16 (after
1000 new cases are detected) and released June 15, and (c) a third lockdown applied
June 18 (after 1000 new cases are detected) and released July 10, 2020.
date (set conservatively to Sept. 1) and see similar behavior
as New York, New Jersey, and Texas. Most of the additional
smaller peaks occur in colder months, as is the case for other
coronaviruses including the common cold (25) and influenza
(40). All states show oscillatory behavior in the total daily
case counts over two years when lockdown measures are lifted,
except Louisiana and Washington state. These two states have
significantly higher re-entry rates ρ than the others, and that
for oscillations to be present cycling of populations has to occur
at an intermediate rate – having a high re-entry rate leads to
steady infections; and having no re-entry results in eradication
of the virus (see Supporting Information Sensitivity Analysis
and Discussion).
States may reissue stay-at-home orders if the number of
cases continues to rise after lifting lockdown; such re-issue is
indeed suggested by our model. The possibility of re-imposing
the pseudo-quarantine is explored using the fits for Texas,
where it is possible that new stay-at-home or lockdown orders
would be issued after a large number such as 1,000 new in-
fections per day are detected. Further, a state may choose
to reopen after 14 consecutive days of decreasing infections,
one of the criteria for state re-opening set by the White House
(41). Figure 6 shows: (a) the increase in confirmed cases after
the state is reopened, (b) the rise in cases after a second round
of lockdown, and (c) additional increases after a third round of
lockdown. From figure 6 we conclude that waiting for 14 days
of steady decline in new infections prior to reopening does not
guarantee that a peak in infections is avoided. The number of
people sequestered by the second and third lockdowns was set
to the qmax determined by fitting to the empirical data. This
suggests that multiple pseudo-quarantines can be effective only
if more people comply, or spend more time under lockdown.
We tested the effect of increasing the number of consecutive
days in pseudo-quarantine for Texas by releasing the pseudo-
quarantined after 28 days of decreasing confirmed cases, as
suggested by the governors of Delaware and Illinois (42, 43)
(figure 7). A similar behavior to reopening after 14 consecutive
days of decreasing cases was revealed – the number of cases
rise after release – with no significant difference in growth rate
and long-term asymptotic behavior – even after two lockdowns.
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Fig. 7. Predictions for removal of quarantine and its re-
application after 28 consecutive days of declining detected
cases for Texas. Predicted cases after: (a) a second lockdown applied on
May 16 (after 1000 new cases are detected) and released June 28, and (b) a third
lockdown applied on July 1 (after 1000 new cases are detected), and released August
5, 2020.
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Fig. 8. Effects of applying lockdowns sooner than states had
specified. (a) Predicted total cases (U + I), and (b) cumulative deaths for New
York state. (c) Predicted total cases, and (d) cumulative deaths for Texas.
This implies that increased compliance needs to be enforced;
contact tracing will inevitably be needed.
Recent counterfactual simulations explored possible Covid-
19 outcomes with an alternate history by setting lockdown
measures sooner in their metapopulation model (being sets of
US county populations connected by individuals who migrate
in and out of the sets, such as for work travel) (44). The
virus in the metapopulation was described with a SEIR model
(an extended version of the SIR model, which includes an
additional compartment for Exposed (E)), and they predict
that New York city would have had 209,987 fewer Covid-19
cases and 17,514 fewer deaths by May 3, 2020, had lockdown
measures been implemented one week earlier than March
20 – among other such scenarios of implementing lockdowns
sooner by two and three weeks (44). To see how our novel
SQUIDER model compares with this study, we implemented
shutdown measures sooner than had been done by setting t∗
to earlier dates for New York State and Texas while qmax was
used from our fits, with the lockdown maintained; see figure
8. We similarly find a dramatic decrease in the number of
cases and deaths in New York state, whereas Texas shows
moderate decreases. For example, our model suggests that
had lockdowns occurred one week sooner, by May 3 there
would have been ≈12,750 fewer deaths in New York state and
≈400 fewer deaths in Texas.
Figure 8a shows that, for all the scenarios, the number of
daily infections peaks and declines with the peak decreasing
further for each additional week by which lockdown was set
back; similarly in fig. 8b the cumulative deaths plateau to
lower levels. In contrast, fig. 8c shows an endemic situation for
Texas’ daily infections, suggesting the stay-at-home measure
one, two, and three weeks sooner pushes the peaks to a later
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time with slightly smaller values. All curves converge to the
same long-term value because the sequestration compliance
qmax was not varied from the fit to Texas data. Figure 8d
shows that the cumulative deaths in Texas rise steadily re-
gardless of when measures were implemented; however, the
number of deaths is reduced for measures implemented ear-
lier. These curves’ long-term slopes all increase with the same
rate due to keeping the death rate γ at the value from Texas’
data fit. Texas’ predicted counterfactual model outcomes are
likely due to a stable endemic attractor in the model system
(45), suggesting that stricter measures (such as increased lock-
down compliance and contact tracing) would always have been
needed to overcome this outbreak.
Discussion. Several studies in the peer-reviewed literature and
various pre-print servers have modeled the growth of Covid-19
infections and deaths in the US or its various states. One
of these uses a SEIR model (Susceptible, Exposed, Infected,
Removed) implemented on a network to simulate inter-state
travel (46). They predict that, in the absence of countermea-
sures, the outbreak peaks on day 54 in their simulation (May
10, 2020). They also predict that on day 50, the number
of cases has decreased in New York, New Jersey, Washing-
ton, and Louisiana whereas Texas and California have many
increasing cases. Other SEIR-type models with additional
compartments (17, 18) including quarantine, predict that the
US outbreak peaks near May 10, 2020 (17), or peaks in the
general population 15 weeks into the outbreak if only 5% of
the population practices self-isolation within a day of symp-
tom onset; if 10% of the population self isolates this pushes
the peak by an additional 3 weeks, demonstrating that small
variations can have significant effects (18).
A Covid-19 SEIRS model (where recovered become sus-
ceptible again) including co-infection with additional human
coronavirus strains and a periodic basic reproduction number
R0 corresponding to seasonal forcing, combined with US data,
predicts that wintertime outbreaks will occur for several years
if immunity wanes – as also occurs with other coronaviruses
(47). This study also predicts that the number of confirmed
Covid-19 cases in the first wave strongly depends on the peak
value of R0. Furthermore, social distancing was tested by
reducing R0; applied once this may push the epidemic peak
to the autumn, whereas intermittent application can reduce
the total number of cases (47).
As expected for nonlinear systems, some predictions, even
if accurate for a short time, can deviate significantly with
increased time. A logistic model of Covid-19 growth in the
US predicts that the cumulative number of cases plateaus by
May 14, 2020 (48). Alternatively, a neural network parametric
model was developed, which predicted that the US would reach
the peak number of cases by April 8, 2020 (49). Additionally,
a sigmoidal Hill-type model predicts that the US will have
735,920 cases within 76 days of the outbreak, with 41,285
deaths (50). In contrast, our model predicts significantly more
Covid-19 cases and deaths, with an extended duration past 2
years for the majority of states examined. Note: all disease
models come with drawbacks. Our model is not mechanistic;
it says nothing about Covid-19 specifically. While the quality
of our fits to current data is very good, the accuracy of the
projections depends on the reliability of the data used to
generate the fit parameters.
Delays in transitions between compartments (such as our
pseudo-quarantine), and in transitioning between several com-
partments (effectively causing a delay) prior to re-entry in
the susceptible population are known to cause oscillations
in SIR type models (45) – reintroducing individuals into the
susceptible compartment de-stabilizes the steady rate of infec-
tions. Temporary immunity, modeled by our reintroduction
of recovered and excluded populations into the susceptible
compartment, produces yearly oscillations such as found in in-
fluenza and other human corona viruses (i.e. “common colds”)
(25, 51). It is quite likely that Covid-19 will become endemic
in the United States with yearly spikes in cases.
We have chosen to not include vaccination in our model,
even though the race for development is currently underway
(52); rather we have focussed on non-medical interventions.
Including such an effect is feasible in our model, where vacci-
nations would reduce the susceptible population. This could
be at a constant rate, such as for newborn infants receiving
the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine (53), or it could be a time
dependent term reflecting people’s confidence in vaccinations
(54). We look forward to seeing the effect of vaccination on
our model predictions once Covid-19 vaccination has been
demonstrated to be safe and effective in both animals and
humans – estimated to be possible by autumn 2021 (55).
In conclusion, we have developed a compartment model
taking into account social distancing, undetected infecteds,
and possible loss of immunity – all issues which are relevant
for Covid-19. The model describes current data very well for
the states selected for study; this more realistic picture of the
disease growth is likely due to both using a larger number
of compartments than traditional SIR-type models, and to
considering additional nonlinearity in the infectious power of
the disease. While projections based on the model are not
wholly optimistic, they do point to the fact that it is quite
possible to avoid more severe outcomes with stronger measures
than have been pursued so far.
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Methods. All numerical simulation for equations 1-8, fits, and data
management were done in Matlab. Data for cumulative confirmed
cases and deaths were obtained from the Johns Hopkins University
(JHU) Center for Systems Science and Engineering, which has been
making highly credible US and global Covid-19 time-series statistics
available to the public on the GitHub (27) website. Raw data
in the original CSV files were converted to Matlab table data
structures for ease of access; since the US data were broken out by
municipality/county, it was necessary to aggregate this to create
each state wide time series. 2019 estimates of state populations
used for normalization were acquired from the US Census Bureau
(56).
Fits (least squares) of numerically generated curves to the data
were obtained using Matlab’s lsqcurvefit using a trust-region-
reflective algorithm (57). One of the benefits of this fitting routine
is that fit parameters can be given bounds or fixed values (the latter
being especially useful during model development and testing). Fit
parameters were: all model rate parameters (β, , δ, α, γ, and ρ),
power law exponent a, initial condition for unknown infecteds U(0),
plus two parameters governing sequestration of populations due to
social distancing – peak q value and date of application t∗. Since all
the rates are bound between 0 and 1, the t∗ parameter was rescaled
by the total time of the simulation to fall within the same range
(this helps the fitting routine when determining step sizes while
revising the current solution). Fits were made comparing certain
selected and/or aggregated simulation results against normalized
JHU data for cumulative confirmed cases and deaths, simultaneously.
lsqcurvefit default values were used for tolerances, iterations, and
step size, but because the proportions of state populations were
so small simulation results and normalized data were rescaled to
increase the magnitude of the error, preventing the fit routine from
prematurely settling for a solution (the scaling formula was chosen
so that the norm of the rescaled test data was equal to the number
of elements in the test data matrix).
Simulation results were generated using Matlab’s ode45 function,
which uses an explicit Runge-Kutta (4, 5) formula. Default settings
were used for the solver, except that the maximum step-size was
constrained to be ≤ 0.5 days (this prevents the solver, which uses
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DR
AF
T
an adaptive step-size, from accidentally stepping over the sequestra-
tion date t∗). The implementation of the model itself, coded in a
function that is given as an argument to ode45, is for the most part
straightforward; the only aspect that requires any further comment
is the handling of the sequestration function q(t).
As mentioned above, sequestration is modelled as a smoothly
shaped pulse centered at time t∗. Since the system of ODEs works
by transferring populations at various rates between compartments,
in practice we set a temporary rate which changes every time the
solver calls the model subroutine. For this we use the value of a
Gaussian curve at x = t with mean value t∗, height normalized,
and width set so as to achieve the sequestration we desire (easily
calculated using Matlab’s normpdf function). Since ode45’s adaptive
step-size decreases when it detects unexpected movement in the q
rate, a well resolved sampling of different values near the peak t∗
is obtained. To make analysis more straightforward, we decided
that the peak rate given to the solver would be equal to the total
sequestration effect (e.g., if we set the peak rate to 0.15, then
roughly 15% of the S and U compartments would ultimately be
moved into the Q compartment). To achieve this, for peak rates
≤ 0.625 we normalized the height to the peak rate, and set the
standard deviation to a value between 0.4 and 0.625 determined by
trial and error and fit to a cubic polynomial. For peak rates above
0.625, a much more complicated formula was needed to achieve the
desired effect; since such high sequestration never appeared in any
of the fits we will omit any further discussion of this, except to
say that to get effective clearance (99.84%) of the entire relevant
compartments we use a Gaussian with both height and width set
to ≈ 1.6.
Lastly, for the purpose of doing projections the model im-
plementation subroutine accepts an arbitrary number of peak
rate/activation date pairs tacked onto the end of the parameter
vector it takes as one of its arguments. This allows us to test the
effect of doing several interventions of possibly different magnitudes.
Also, a negative peak rate is implemented as returning the specified
proportion of the sequestered population in Q back to S (since
ode45 has no facility for keeping track of the ratio of S and U
populations that were originally sequestered, it was felt that return-
ing everyone to S was the most sensible approach). To make this
feasible codewise, at any particular time t only the qi with peak
time t∗i closest to t is executed. In practice, if peaks are set too
close to each other (e.g. within half a week or so) they may interfere
with each other’s ability to achieve full sequestration or release; but
since this is essentially the case in real life as well we thought it not
to be a priority to address this issue.
The reproduction number R0. In epidemiology, R0 is “the basic re-
production number of a disease” and denotes the expected number
of cases produced by a single infected individual in a completely
susceptible population. This number, extensively used in epidemio-
logical modeling, describes whether an epidemic breaks out or not;
if the value is less than 1 an outbreak does not result in an epidemic,
whereas if it is larger than 1 an epidemic occurs (58). Hence if it
close to 1, this has implications. For a value slightly smaller than 1,
the outbreak will eventually go away, and for a value slightly larger
than one the outbreak does not. If R0 is much larger than 1, then
the outbreak will be stronger and faster. In simple SIR models,
it is the product of transmissibility (a probability or likelihood of
becoming infected), contact rate (the amount of time needed in
contact in order to be infected), and duration of infectiousness
(time to recover), namely β/α. Our model is more complex (due
to the seven identified compartments); therefore R0 must involve
additional factors such as q(t), ρ, , δ, as well as initial conditions.
To compute R0, we follow the method outlined by van den Driessche
(58).
Let x = (x1, x2, ···, xn) be the number of individuals in each com-
partment, where m < n compartments contain infected individuals
– here the U and I compartments. Consider the model equations
written in the form dxi
dt
= Fi(x) − Vi(x) for i = 1, 2, · · ·,m. Here
Fi(x) is the rate of appearance of new infections in compartment i
(i.e. positive terms), and Vi(x) is the rate of transitions between
compartment i and other infected compartments (i.e. negative
terms). It is assumed that Fi = 0 if i ∈ [m + 1, n]; i.e. it is zero
for compartments that do not describe infected populations. Define
matrices F =
[
∂Fi(x(0))
∂xj
]
and V =
[
∂Vi(x(0))
∂xj
]
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m.
Let ψ(0) be the number of infected and undetected infected at the
initial time of detection. Then FV −1ψ(0) gives the expected num-
ber of new infections; i.e. the matrix FV −1 has the (i, j) item equal
to the expected number of secondary infections in compartment i
produced by an infected individual introduced in compartment j.
Then R0 is given by the largest positive eigenvalue of FV −1.
For our model,
F =
[
βaS0U
a−1
0 0
δ 0
]
, [9]
V =
[
+ δ + q(t) 0
0 α+ γ
]
, [10]
which yields
R0 =
βaS0U
a−1
0
δ + + q(t)
, [11]
where S0 = S(0) ≈ 1 and U0 = U(0) is a fit parameter. Note that
F and V are 2×2 matrices because we have only two compartments
of infected populations – Infected (I) and Undetected infected (U).
Considering that q is time dependent, we use its maximum value
to estimate R0; so qmax represents the best scenario for fastest
eradication of the virus.
Sensitivity analysis.We vary the values of the parameters from the
California fits to determine the model sensitivity to those values.
Starting with the parameters in the nonlinear term βSUa in equa-
tion 2,
dU
dt
= βSUa − q(t)U − U − δU,
β and a (see figure 1), note that the model is very sensitive to
small changes in β, and particularly a, which is to be expected for
these driving parameters of the infection. In particular, increasing
β decreases the time to achieve a peak in the daily case count and
increases the peak value – expected if the disease were more conta-
gious, contacts were increased between the S and U populations,
or both. Increasing β also raises the number of cumulative deaths
faster. Decreasing a has a similar effect (since all compartments are
rescaled to have a value less than one); as a is decreased by very
small increments, the peak number of deaths increases and occurs
sooner in time, and the cumulative deaths increase faster. Lowering
a increases the infectious power of the virus.
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Supporting Figure 1. Effect of varying contact rate β and infective
power a on the total infected population and deaths. (a) Total
infected, and (b) deaths for β values ranging from 0.6-0.9. (c) Total infected, and (d)
deaths for a values ranging from 0.98-1. California fits were used for this comparison.
In figure 2, the effect of varying the peak pseudo-quarantine value
qmax, and time of application t∗ are shown. The value of qmax has
little effect on timing for the peaks in the total infected population;
rather it affects the late time behavior of both total infected and
deceased populations. The number of daily infections drops off
after about a year past the peak date as the number of susceptible
individuals available to infect decreases as qmax increases; the
cumulative number of deaths drop off at a similar time as well. We
also observe that moving t∗ back in time reduces secondary infection
peaks and deaths. As t∗ is increased, the number of daily infections
and cumulative deaths drop off at a later time; this is expected
as a fraction of the population is removed from the susceptible
compartment at a later time.
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Supporting Figure 2. Effect of varying peak pseudo-quarantine rate
qmax and time applied t∗ on the total infected population and
deaths. (a) Total infected, and (b) deaths for qmax values ranging from 0-0.4. (c)
Total infected, and (d) deaths for t∗ values ranging from 0.2-0.8. California fits were
used for this comparison.
Figure 3(a)-(b) shows that increasing detection rate δ reduces
the total number of infections and cumulative deaths; this is to be
expected as detection reduces the number of infecteds affecting the
susceptible population. A similar effect is observed for increasing
the exclusion rate  due to undetected recovery shown in figure
3(c)-(d).
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Supporting Figure 3. Effect of varying exclusion rate  and detec-
tion rate δ on the total infected population and deaths. (a) Total
infected, and (b) deaths for δ values ranging from 0.3-0.6. (c) Total infected, and (b)
deaths for  values ranging from 0-0.2. California fits were used for this comparison.
We determine that increasing the re-entry rate ρ broadens the
late-time tail of the daily total infection curve and increases the
number of deaths, shown in figure 4(a)-(b). This occurs due to
increasing the number of susceptible individuals available to infect
at a steady rate. Also note that, for certain ρ values, a secondary
peak emerges, whereas as ρ is further increased, the secondary peak
disappears. This is due to an instability in the number of infections
as ρ increases; when it is large enough the number of new infections
stabilizes.
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Supporting Figure 4. Effect of varying re-entry rate ρ on the total
infected population and deaths. (a) Total infected, and (b) deaths for ρ
values ranging from 0-0.2. California fits were used for this comparison.
We also find that increasing the number of initially undetected
infected people U(0) shifts the peak of the current total infected
population earlier in time but does not significantly alter the peak
value, and slightly increases the number of deaths, shown in figure
5. Some might find this behavior surprising, as having significantly
more spreaders in a susceptible population should increase the peak
of daily cases. From figures 1-5, we conclude that the model depends
most sensitively on β, a, qmax, t∗, , and ρ, since small variations
cause large changes in the shape of the daily total infected curve.
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Supporting Figure 5. Effect of varying number of undetected infect-
eds U(0) on the total infected population and deaths. (a) Total
infected, and (b) deaths for U(0)N values ranging from 0.1-100. California fits were
used for this comparison.
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